Δευτέρα, 11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2017

Wittgenstein... and the law... and the language...

"To adopt a concept from Wittgenstein's later philosophy, we can regard law as a category of phenomena that display no more than a 'family resemblance' to one another. As he explains, 'we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, somtimes similarities of detail' ... But there need be no signle identifying or defining feature; it may be impossible to build a single model in order to explain what law is. If we think that 'law' must have a precise definition or we misunderstand the complexity of the phenomena that the category encompasses, we make mistakes about what it is and assume that it works in a certain way; we may ask the wrong questions - about origins, institutions, or functions; or we may deny that social phenomena are law in a way that does not make sense. If we are to be true to our own concept, and to the language rules that govern its application, we must recognize and explore this diversity.

"There are, nevertheless, right and wrong ways to apply any particular term and to analyse it. The rules and definitions for the use of a concept do not need to be very precise ...; if a category, such as law, is abstract, then the rules are complex, and metaphorical useage may increase this complexity, but they must be explored if we are to understand and analyse its nature. How, then, is this exploration to be done? We are after more than a discussion of how the term 'law' is used in everyday language. Rodney Needham (1975) adopted the term 'polythetic classification' to capture Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance and to discuss the challenges it presents for the anthropologist. 'It is the recognition ... of a class composed by sporadic resemblances', he says, that is needed for the study of jural institutions, as much as for the study of human capacities ... . Comparison provides a particular challenge. What is needed 'is not a convenient technique for cutting down the number of variables, but a means of accomodating as many as possible' ... . The possibility of borderline cases is always present."

Τα αποσπάσματα είναι από το βιβλίο της F. Pirie, pp. 8-9.

Στην πρώτη φωτογραφία, δύο από τα ωραιότερα βιβλία που έχω διαβάσει και που εμπνέονται από τη ζωή του Wittgenstein - το πρώτο είναι μια εξαιρετική βιογραφία.

Τετάρτη, 6 Σεπτεμβρίου 2017

Conflict of rules

Από το άρθρο του J. Hage, "Logical Tools for Legal Pluralism", inLaw and the New Logics (Edited by H. Patrick Glenn and Lionel D. Smith), Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 89, 106-107.

"The development of the internet, the rise of transnational law, the coexistence of different legal traditions and subtraditions, and globalization, all increase opportunities for conflicts between rules of different legal systems. One of the tasks of legal science is to deal with these possible conflicts and, as Glenn pointed out, the insights of modern logic are one place to look for assistance. Logic neither can nor should dictate a particular way of dealing with rule conflicts, but it can be of help by providing a conceptual framework that clearly defines when a rule conflict occurs and which tools are available to avoid these conflicts or to deal with them."

"A conflict of rule occurs when it is possible that two or more rules attach incompatible legal consequences to a case. Within a single legal system, the possibility of rule conflicts is limited by adding scope conditions to the ordinary rule conditions. Mechanisms such as PIL extend this role of scope conditions to the relation between rules from different systems. Another limitation of the possibility for rule conflicts consists in the limitation of the powers of rule creating agents. Often it is impossible to create rules that conflict with already existing rules."

"If a conflict occurs between rules of different legal systems, there is logically speaking no need to deal with the conflict. It is logically well possible that an agent ought to do X from the point of view of one legal system, and ought to refrain from doing X from the point of view of another legal system. However, an agent who is subject to incompatible prescriptions from different legal systems is burdened with a dilemma. Legal system often come to the assistance of such individuals by referring to the rules of other systems, or by incorporating 'foreign' law."

Κυριακή, 3 Σεπτεμβρίου 2017

Private Art Collections, March 2017, Rome - you can listen to the interventions

Μπορείτε εδώ να ακούσετε όλες τις εισηγήσεις του συνεδρίου για τις ιδιωτικές συλλογές έργων τέχνης, στη Ρώμη, τον περασμένο Μάρτιο (2017), στο οποίο συνέδριο συμμετείχα και εγώ. Παρά τους τίτλους στα γαλλικά, οι περισσότερες εισηγήσεις - και η δική μου - ήταν στα αγγλικά. Στο άμεσο μέλλον θα δημοσιευθούν και σε τόμο.

Τετάρτη, 23 Αυγούστου 2017

Law is...

"Law (and translations thereof) is whatever social groups conventionally attach the label "law" to."

"Natural necessity owing to human nature and requirements and tendencies within social groups appears to be behind fundamental aspects of law. Scientific evidence presently is thin, so these assertions are speculative. The universality of family units and universal reactions that property of others should not be taken, deceptive exchanges are wrong, and intentional injuries are wrong suggest there is a naturalistic basis for basic rules of social intercourse (although the content of the rules vary accross societies) - the first connotation of law. The apparent necessity for large social groups to use hierarchical organizations to manage cooperation and conflict, which operate more effectively whwn backed by organized coercive force, is behind the second connotation of law. Another apparently universal trait within social groups is a strong sense of justice and fairness (again with much variation), which underlies the third connotation of law."

"All forms of law operate in social space alongside and dependent on other norms, rules, institutions, and modes of ordering - customs, morals, etiquette, habits, practices, institutional structures, language, shared concepts and ideologies. The thick social nromative stew has many ingredients, law one among others, which often exert greater immediate influence than law. Formal legal institutions are influenced by and rely on supportive social beliefs and institutions."

Τα αποσπάσματα είναι από το εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον καινούριο βιβλίο:

Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 194-196.

Οι φωτογραφίες είναι από το Ναύπλιο - Αύγουστος 2017.

Τρίτη, 22 Αυγούστου 2017

Comparative Law and Anthropology

Θα κυκλοφορήσει τον Νοέμβριο 2017

Μεγάλη η χαρά μου που συμμετέχω:


1. Law and Anthropology: Research Traditions
Sally Falk Moore

2. Whose Comparative Law? A Global Perspective
Laura Nader

3. Anthropology on Trial: the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Controversy (1993-2001)
P. G. McHugh

4. First Nation Control over Archaeological Sites: Contemporary Issues in Heritage Law, Policy and Practice
Catherine Bell 

5. The Hybridity of Law in Namibia and the Role of Community Law in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Oliver C. Ruppel and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting 

6. Legal Pluralism – Linking Law and Culture in National Resource Co-Management and Environmental Compliance
Anastasia Telesetsky

7. Governance Disputes Involving First Nations in Canada: Culture, Custom and Dispute Resolution Outside of the Indian Act
William B. Shipley

8. Anthropology in International Law: the Case of Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage
Janet Blake

9. Cultural Landscapes Significant to Indigenous Peoples
James A. R. Nafziger

10. Narrative of Laws, Narratives of Peoples
Elina N. Moustaira

11. Images of Muhammad: Religious Law and Freedom of Expression
Richard Francaviglia

12. Law, Society and Landscape in early Scandinavia
Stefan Brink

13. Transgenic Maize: The Mexican Cultural Battle
Jorge Sanchez Cordero

14. A Trinity of Culture, Law and Politics: Legal Anthropology of the Bonded Labor System in Nepal
Upendra D. Acharya

15. Global Law Firms in Real-World Contexts: Practical Limitations and Ethical Implications
Eve Darian-Smith

16. An Historical, Cultural and Political Perspective of Corruption in the Balkans

17. The Anthropologist as Expert Witness: A Personal Account
Richard Price

18. Intellectual Property Law in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Trademark ‘Piracy’ in Guatemala
Kedron Thomas

19. The Voice of the Stranger: Foreign L.L.M. Students’ Experiences of Culture, Law and Pedagogy in US Law Schools
Mindie Lazarus-Black

20. Distance in Law and Globalisation: Armchair Anthropology Revisited
Riaz Tejani


Δευτέρα, 21 Αυγούστου 2017

Montesquieu - Droit Comparé

Τα είχε πει πολύ καθαρά, ο Montesquieu, στο "De l'esprit des lois", 1748 (GF Flammarion, Paris 1979):

    "Elles [les lois] doivent être tellement propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, que c'est un très grand hasard si celles d'une nation peuvent convenir à une autre.
    Il faut qu'elles se rapportent à la nature et au principe du gouvernement qui est établi, ou qu'on veut établir; soit qu'elles le forment, comme font  les lois politiques; soit qu'elles le maintiennent, comme font les lois civiles.
    Elles doivent être relatives au physique du pays; au climat glacé, brûlant, ou tempéré; à la qualité du terrain, à sa situation, à sa grandeur; au genre de vie des peuples, laboureurs, chasseurs, ou pasteurs : elles doivent se rapporter au dégré de liberté que la constitution peut souffrir, à la religion des habitants, à leurs inclinations, à leurs richesses, à leur nombre, à leur commerce, à leurs moeurs, à leurs manières : enfin elles ont des rapports entre elles; elles en ont avec leur origine, avec l'objet du législateur, avec l'ordre des choses sur lesquelles elles sont établies. C'est dans toutes ces vues qu'il faut les considérer."

Και για όσους δεν διαβάζουν γαλλικά, στην αγγλική μετάφρασή του (Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge University Press 1989, p. 8-9):

"Laws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made, that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another.
Law must relate to the nature and the principle of the government that is established or that one wants to establish; whether they form it, as may be said of political laws; or whether they support it, as in the case of civil institutions.
They should be related to the physical aspect of the country; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established. They must be considered from all those points of view."